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Mendoza: "Where Can I Go?"

“WHERE CAN I GO?”: EXCESSIVENESS OF THE
GEOGRAPHICAL RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE SEXUAL
ASSAULT REFORM ACT IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
Leslie Anne Mendoza*

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
WILLIAMS V. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION1
(DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2016)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine an elderly gentleman who has spent twenty years of
his life in a correctional facility. Imagine how he longed for the day
when he finally gets out; thinking he has already served his time.
Imagine his yearning for his family, friends, and the place he has
called home for more than forty years. Imagine his disappointment
when he finds out that he is prohibited from visiting not only his
home but also his lawyer’s office and his treatment programs. With
nowhere else to go, he attempts to move into a homeless shelter; only
to find that being in the shelter is a violation of his parole. At that
point, he thinks to himself, “Where can I go?”

*

J.D. Candidate, 2017, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. Legal
Management, Ateneo de Manila University, 2014. I would like to express my sincere
gratitude for the unconditional love and support of my parents, Wenifredo and Amelia Janet
Mendoza, as well as my siblings, Loren, Lanz and Louis Mendoza. I would also like to
show my deepest appreciation for John Christopher Lopez for his constant encouragement
and motivation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my Note Editor, Rhona Mae
Amorado, for her valuable guidance and hard work throughout the writing process of this
Case Note.
1
24 N.Y.S.3d 18 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2016), appeal docketed, No. APL-2016-00031
(2016).
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Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution provides,
“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”2 The ex post facto clause
prohibits retroactive laws that criminalize innocent acts when
committed, imposes additional punishment for a crime after its
commission, and alters the evidentiary requirements for a conviction
to the detriment of the defendant.3 The ex post facto clause generally
applies to criminal statutes.4 However, it may apply to a civil
regulatory scheme that is excessively punitive in intent or effect.5 In
determining whether a statute is punitive in intent or effect, courts
consider several factors.6 Courts have discretion in considering
which factor is more significant than the other.7
Williams, a sex offender on parole, claimed that the Sexual
Assault Reform Act (SARA)8 violated the ex post facto clause
because its geographical restraints are so limiting that he is prohibited
from residing or traveling in the city where he lived before he was
incarcerated, New York City.9 The Appellate Division, First
Department, after applying the factors enumerated in the Supreme
Court case Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,10 reached the conclusion

2

U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388-89 (1798).
4
Id.
5
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
6
See infra text accompanying note 95.
7
Id.
8
The Sexual Assault Reform Act (hereinafter “SARA”) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, where a
person serving a sentence for an offense defined in article one hundred
thirty, one hundred thirty-five or two hundred sixty-three of the penal
law or section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of the penal law and the victim
of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense
or such person has been designated a level three sex offender pursuant to
subdivision six of section one hundred sixty-eight-l of the correction
law, is released on parole or conditionally released pursuant to
subdivision one or two of this section, the board shall require, as a
mandatory condition of such release, that such sentenced offender shall
refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds, as that
term is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of the penal
law, or any other facility or institution primarily used for the care or
treatment of persons under the age of eighteen while one or more of such
persons under the age of eighteen are present.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c (14) (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added).
9
Williams v. Dep’t of Corrs. & Cmty. Supervision, 24 N.Y.S.3d 18, 20-21 (App. Div. 1st
Dep’t 2016).
10
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
3
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that SARA is not punitive in intent or character and does not violate
the ex post facto clause.11
Although the Williams court held that SARA does not violate
the ex post facto clause, there is limited case law that involves the
constitutionality of SARA with regard to the ex post facto clause as
applied to parolees in urban neighborhoods.12 This Note suggests
that there must be an assessment that considers the additional
limitations of SARA as applied to a densely populated area, which
makes it unreasonably difficult for a parolee to find suitable housing
or to travel. Specifically, this Note will propose conducting
individual assessments on parolees in urban neighborhoods to prevent
the potential excessive and unreasonable effect of the SARA.
This Note will be divided into nine parts. Part II of this Note
will discuss the facts and procedural history of Williams. Part III will
provide a discussion of its majority opinion and an analysis of the
Appellate Division’s reasoning in applying the ex post facto clause
framework outlined in Kennedy. Part IV will then discuss Justice
Kapnick’s dissenting opinion. Parts V and VI will compare ex post
facto clauses of the United States and New York State Constitutions
and the analysis applied by the Federal and the New York State
courts, and discuss SARA’s history and its ex post facto clause
analysis. In Part VII, the holding of Williams and its effect on
parolees in urban neighborhoods will be explored, as well as how the
court could have reached a more reasonable decision through an
individualized assessment that takes into consideration both the sex
offender’s risk of recidivism as well as residency before
incarceration. Lastly, Part VIII will provide a summary and a
suggestion to the New York Court of Appeals and courts which hear
similar cases.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 21, 1995, Williams was convicted of first
degree crimes of rape and sodomy, as well as endangering the
11

Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20.
See Berlin v. Evans, 923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that as
applied to the low-risk level one sex offender petitioner, SARA violates the prohibition on ex
post facto laws. In that case, SARA banned Petitioner from his New York City apartment of
forty years because of the geographical restraints imposed); see discussion infra Section
VI.B.
12
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welfare of a child.13 Williams was sentenced to four concurrent
terms of seven to twenty-one years.14 He was sixty-four years old
when he was released to parole supervision on December 20, 2012.15
His sentence is due for completion on November 18, 2016.16
Williams’s parole was granted subject to restrictions on his
place of residence and his travel.17 Under SARA, Williams can
neither live nor travel within 1000 feet of school grounds.18 Williams
claimed that this mandatory condition rendered the possibility of
finding housing within New York City futile.19 For example,
Williams was living in a homeless shelter for men at Bellevue, but
that residence violated SARA because it was within the prohibited
buffer zone.20 Williams also claimed that the travel restrictions made
it impossible for him to travel within Manhattan to satisfy his
requirements of visiting his parole officer and his drug and sex
offender treatment programs and, similarly, made it impossible for
him to visit his “doctors, lawyers, social workers, friends or
family.”21 Williams submitted into the record a map entitled
“Manhattan No-go Zones and Public Bus Network,” which showed
that a significant area of Manhattan was off-limits to him.22
As a result, Williams claimed that “SARA violates the Ex
Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution and his
substantive due process rights under the Federal and New York State
Constitutions.”23 He initially filed a hybrid declaratory judgment and
Article 78 petition.24 The Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision, in turn, claimed SARA was constitutional and denied
most of Williams’s assertions about SARA’s ramifications on him.25

13

Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20-22.
Id. (citing People v. Williams, 682 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999)).
15
Id. at 20.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20.
19
Id.
20
Id. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision had formerly placed
parolees subject to SARA at the Bellevue center; however, it has changed its policy and
concluded that the shelter was no longer a SARA-compliant residence. Id.
21
Id. at 20-21.
22
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20-21.
23
Id. (capitalization in original).
24
Id. at 21.
25
Id.
14
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The Supreme Court of New York for New York County held that
SARA was constitutional.26
III.

THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S REASONING

Williams appealed, and the issue before the Appellate
Division of the First Department was whether SARA’s mandatory
1000-foot buffer zone violates the ex post facto clause of the United
States Constitution.27 The 1000-foot buffer zone bars sex offender
parolees from living or traveling near areas where children usually
gather such as schools and parks.28 The ex post facto clause prohibits
states from passing laws that impose additional punishments for past
offenses.29 “Two critical elements must be present for a criminal or
penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must
apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must
disadvantage the offender affected by it.”30 In this case, there was no
contention as to the retrospective character of SARA which was both
passed and amended years after the conviction of Williams and
imposes compulsory limitations on him as a parolee.31
To determine whether a retrospective enactment violates the
ex post facto clause, the Appellate Division applied an intent-effects
test.32 The first step was to ascertain whether the intent of the
Legislature was to enact a punitive statute or a nonpunitive civil
regulatory scheme.33 If the legislative intent of the statute was to
impose punishment, then the retroactive enactment violates the ex
post facto clause.34 If a civil regulatory scheme was intended, then
the court must decide whether its purpose or effect is so extensively
punitive that it negates the State’s civil intention.35
Based on SARA’s text and legislative history and its
amendments, the Appellate Division concluded that the statute was
intended to be a civil regulatory scheme for the protection of children
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 20.
Id.
Kellogg v. Travis, 796 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 2003).
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980).
Id. at 9.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23; see discussion infra Section VI.B.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)).
Id.
Id.
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from sexual predators.36 The court concluded that the residential and
travel restrictions found in the statute’s text were limited to areas
where children were expected to be and to times when children were
there.37 In addition, the restriction only applies to sex offenders
whom the Legislature thinks were highly likely to reoffend against
child victims.38 It is evident from the language of the statute that the
Legislature intended to protect children rather than punish
offenders.39
Nonetheless, Williams argued that SARA was punitive in
intent because it incorporated the definition of “school grounds”
provided by Penal Law § 220.00(14),40 and because the statute only
applied to parolees.41 The court rejected this argument.42 It reasoned
that the reference to the Penal Law was insufficient to show criminal
intent.43 The court also pointed out that SARA imposes no additional
restrictions or punishment on parolees.44 For these reasons, the court
concluded that SARA was not intended to be punitive.45
The court thereafter considered whether the scheme was so
punitive in its effect or purpose as to run afoul of the State’s intention
for it to be a civil statutory scheme.46 In determining whether a
statute is punitive in purpose or effect, courts consider seven

36

Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
School grounds is defined as:
(a) in or on or within any building, structure, athletic playing field,
playground or land contained within the real property boundary line of a
public or private elementary, parochial, intermediate, junior high,
vocational, or high school, or (b) any area accessible to the public
located within one thousand feet of the real property boundary line
comprising any such school or any parked automobile or other parked
vehicle located within one thousand feet of the real property boundary
line comprising any such school. For the purposes of this section an
“area accessible to the public” shall mean sidewalks, streets, parking
lots, parks, playgrounds, stores and restaurants.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(14) (McKinney 2009).
41
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25.
37
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factors.47 The court in Williams identified five factors relevant to the
case.48 The five factors were whether the restriction was an
imposition of affirmative disability or restraint; has been historically
regarded as punishment; promotes traditional aims of punishment;
has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; and was excessive
with respect to its nonpunitive purpose.49
The court agreed with Williams that SARA’s geographical
restrictions are affirmative restraints, can be historically regarded as
punishment, and promote deterrence, which is a traditional goal of
punishment.50 The geographical restraints SARA imposes are
affirmative and may be compared to “banishment” or a way of
compelling a person to leave a place for a certain amount of time.51
Historically, banishment has been viewed as criminal punishment.52
While SARA’s restraint on residence and travel is akin to
banishment, the court noted that this label was insignificant as a way
of establishing punitive effect.53 The court reasoned that these factors
were inadequate because SARA only applies to parolees who have
limited liberty rights.54 Therefore, the court disagreed with Williams
and held that SARA is not punitive in effect.55 Moreover, the court
also rejected Williams’s argument that, because SARA promotes
traditional goals of punishment, it is punitive.56 The court reasoned
that promoting a traditional goal of punishment does not necessarily
entail that a statute is a criminal penalty.57
The Williams court deemed the last two factors, rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose and excessiveness, most
important in determining whether SARA has a punitive effect.58
47

Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (citation omitted)
(explaining that these factors are neither exhaustive nor dispositive and are only guidelines
in determining whether a retroactive law is punitive and consequently violates the ex post
facto clause); see also infra text accompanying note 95 (enumerating the factors of the
intent-effects test).
48
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 25.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 26.
51
Id. (citing United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905)).
52
Id. at 27 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. 144 at n.23 (1963)).
53
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 27.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 25.
56
Id. at 27.
57
Id.
58
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 28.
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“SARA’s legitimate governmental interest is the protection of
children against people proven to be capable of committing sex
crimes.”59 SARA’s rationale is that limiting access to children would
greatly reduce the likelihood of sex offenders reoffending.60 Thus,
there is a rational connection between SARA’s nonpunitive intent
and its effect. As for excessiveness, Williams argued that the statute
was punitive because there were no individualized risk assessments
relative to the restrictions.61 Williams further argued that the
restrictions applied to all sex offenders on parole, even those who
have not shown any risk of reoffending.62 However, the court
rejected these arguments and reasoned that SARA only applies to
parolees who have limited liberty rights, and thus, its “restraints are
not of a sufficient magnitude to require individualized
assessments.”63 In addition, SARA applies only to level 3 sex
offenders under the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act
(SORA).64 This limits SARA’s application to those who are most
likely to reoffend among sex offenders and not to all sex offenders on
parole.65
The Appellate Division for the First Department held that
SARA and its amendments did not violate the ex post facto clause of
the United States Constitution because it is a retrospective civil
regulatory scheme that is neither punitive in intent nor effect.66
IV.

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Kapnick dissented in part and disagreed with the
majority’s holding that the statute is not punitive in effect and does
not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution.67 She opined that the 1000-foot buffer zone is a
retroactive punishment and the civil intent of SARA is negated by the
statute’s punitive effect.68 She also emphasized the unrebutted
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31.
N.Y. CORR. LAW § 168 et seq. (McKinney 1996).
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 32 (Kapnick, J., dissenting).
Id.
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evidence that Williams was banned from living in or traveling to
almost all parts of Manhattan, where Williams lived for more than
twenty years prior to his incarceration, as well as to large areas of the
other boroughs of New York City.69 SARA also requires Williams to
enter prohibited zones to satisfy his requirements as a parolee such as
to visit his parole officer and his substance abuse and sex offender
treatment programs.70
Justice Kapnick found that there was not enough factual
evidence to show that the 1000-foot buffer around schools has a
rational connection to the legitimate state interest of keeping sex
offenders away from children.71 She added that there was also a lack
of rational relationship between SARA and its stated purpose to the
effect that it only applies to parolees when there is no reference or
data suggesting parolees are more likely to reoffend than those
released without parole.72 Finally, Justice Kapnick also found the
statute to be excessive in relation to its purpose as SARA applies to
level 3 sex offenders under SORA regardless of the age of their
victims and that the geographical restraints are effective twenty-four
hours a day, 365 days a year.73 For these reasons, she concluded that
SARA was punitive in effect, and thus, violates the ex post facto
clause.74
V.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution

Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution provides,
“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”75 Any statute, which
criminalizes an act that was legal when committed, which imposes
additional or harsher punishment after its commission, or which
deprives a criminal defendant of any legal defense available at the

69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 32.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 32 (Kapnick, J., dissenting).
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9.
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time when the act was committed, is prohibited under the
Constitution as ex post facto.76
When the Constitution was adopted, ex post facto laws were
considered to “embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing, or
controlling past transactions, whether they are of a civil or a criminal
nature.”77 The plain meaning and intention of the prohibition on ex
post facto laws are that legislatures of states shall not pass laws after
a person commits an act and that the law should not impose
punishment on that person for having done such act.78 However, this
prohibition may not be evaded by passing a civil measure that is
essentially criminal.79 Generally, ex post facto laws are known to
apply to acts of a criminal nature only.80 The prohibition applies to
all laws that declare an act criminal when the act was not criminal
when committed; or aggravate the punishment of a crime already
committed; or lessen or set a different quantum of evidence necessary
to convict an offender than what was required when the act was
committed.81 All of these are prohibited for being “manifestly unjust
and oppressive.”82
B.

Intent-Effects Test

To determine whether the ex post facto clause is violated,
federal courts first ascertain whether a retroactive statute is intended
to impose punishment or to establish a civil proceeding.83 If it is
punitive, then it is automatically a violation of the ex post facto
clause.84 If it is civil and nonpunitive, then courts further examine
whether the statute is so extensively punitive, either in purpose or
effect, that it negates the State’s intention for it to be a civil
regulatory scheme.85 The federal courts “ordinarily defer to the

76

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (2001) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167
(1925)).
77
JOSEPH STORY, J., COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 485
(1833).
78
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
79
Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878).
80
STORY, supra note 77.
81
STORY, supra note 77.
82
Calder, 3 U.S. at 386.
83
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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legislature’s stated intent[;]”86 thus, “ ‘only the clearest proof’ will
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”87
In
determining whether the effects of a statute are punitive, courts are
also guided by the factors established in Kennedy.88
In Kennedy, certain sections of the Nationality Act of 1940
were challenged.89 The United States brought actions against two
native-born citizens of the United States who left the country
allegedly to evade the military draft service obligations.90 As a result,
both were denied access to the United States on the ground that they
lost their citizenship by remaining outside the jurisdiction of the
country during the war for the purpose of evading service in the
Nation’s armed forces.91 On appeal, the appellate court found that
the statutes were unconstitutional.92 On review, the Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court’s decision concluding that the statutes
were punitive in nature and lacked the procedural standards the
Constitution required.93
In determining whether an Act of Congress is penal or
regulatory, the Supreme Court established factors that must be
considered in relation to the statute, on its face, if there is no
conclusive evidence of congressional intent.94 These factors are:
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint; whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment; whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter; whether its operation will promote
the traditional aims of punishment -- retribution and
deterrence; whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime; whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1996).
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997).
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
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it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned . . . .95
The Supreme Court further noted that an examination of these factors
may result in different outcomes.96 Although the Court in Kennedy
did not go into the details of these factors and based its decision on
congressional debates regarding the punitive nature of the statute,
many federal courts continue to apply the Kennedy factors.97
Forty years later, in Smith v. Doe,98 the United States Supreme
Court illustrated the application of the Kennedy factors in cases
involving laws regulating the activity of sexual offenders and the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.99 The statute at issue in Smith
was Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act, which required persons
convicted of sex and child-kidnapping offenses to register with state
or local law enforcement authorities and provide information such as
their names and addresses which the authorities made public.100 The
statute applied retroactively to offenders who had been convicted
before the law’s enactment.101 Two such individuals brought an ex
post facto action and sought to have the statute declared void as
applied to them.102 The district court granted summary judgment
against the offenders who appealed.103 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the statute was
intended to be a nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme, but held that its
effects were punitive.104 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the Act
violated the ex post facto clause.105
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that the statute did not
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws despite the statute’s
retroactive application to offenders who were convicted before the
95

Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 169.
97
Id. See, e.g., Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986);
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Abuzaid v. Mattox, 726 F.3d 311 (2d Cir.
2013).
98
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
99
Id. at 89, 97.
100
Id. at 90.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 91.
103
Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.
104
Id. at 91-92.
105
Id. at 92.
96
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enactment of the statute.106 The Court reasoned that Alaska’s
legislature intended to create a civil and nonpunitive scheme and
those challenging the statute were not able to show, by the clearest
proof, that the statute’s effect was so punitive that it negated its
nonpunitive intent.107
The United States Supreme Court noted that the framework
necessary for determining whether a law constituted retroactive
punishment forbidden by the ex post facto clause was well
established.108 First, it was necessary to ascertain the intent of the
legislature to impose punishment or civil proceedings.109 If the
statute was intended to impose punishment, then it violates the ex
post facto prohibition.110 On the other hand, if a nonpunitive
regulatory scheme was intended, then it was necessary to further
ascertain whether the scheme’s effects were so punitive as to negate
its civil intent.111 If the effect of the statute is deemed to be punitive,
the statute is unconstitutional for violating the ex post facto clause.112
C.

Banishment

It is not unusual for sex offender statutes to be challenged as
violations of the ex post facto clause because the restraints the
statutes impose are akin to banishment.113 Banishment is defined as
“a punishment inflicted upon criminals, by compelling them to quit a
city, place, or country, for a specific period of time, or for life.”114
Historically, banishment has been regarded as punishment of the
most severe kind.115 In the case of Doe v. Pataki, the district court
held that the public notification provisions of SORA constituted
punishment and violated the ex post facto clause.116 One reason for
the court’s holding was that history suggested that public notification
106

Id. at 92, 105-06.
Id. at 105-06.
108
Smith, 538 U.S at 92.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1997) (In Roe, the
petitioner claimed that he was asked to leave by his landlord and he was ostracized at his
workplace due to the notification system being put into effect).
114
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
115
Id.
116
Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 605 (1996), rev’d, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
107
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was punitive as it was akin to branding and other public forms of
shaming used to punish offenders;117 banishment was imposed for
more severe offenses.118 However, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and held that SORA did not impose punishment,
but merely conditions for the protection of the general public. 119
VI.

NEW YORK STATE APPROACH

Article III, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution
provides, “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the
senate and assembly.”120 The legislature may “make acts criminal
which before were innocent, and ordain punishment in future cases
where before none could have been inflicted. This, in its nature, is a
legislative power, which, by the Constitution of the state, is
committed to the discretion of the legislative body.”121 However, the
inalienable rights secured by the Constitution limit the New York
State legislature.122 Accordingly, with regard to ex post facto laws,
the New York State applies the limitations and prohibitions set forth
in Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution.123 It
provides, “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”124
A.

Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)

SARA provides that sex offenders released on parole are
required,
[a]s a mandatory condition of such release[,] . . . [to]
refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any
school grounds . . . or any other facility or institution
primarily used for the care or treatment of persons
under the age of eighteen while one or more of such
persons under the age of eighteen are present.125
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id.
Id.
See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id.
Lawton v. Steele, 23 N.E. 878, 878 (N.Y. 1890).
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
Id.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-c (14) (McKinney 2015).
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The statute’s legislative history supports that it was enacted to keep
sex offenders away from children and not to impose additional
punishment on sex offenders for their past criminal acts.126 The
memoranda of the State Education Department, the New York
Attorney General and the sponsor of the bill, Assemblyman Harvey
Weisenberg, all expressed the goal of the statute to protect children
from threats posed by sex offenders.127
SARA was first enacted in 2000, and its geographical
restrictions only applied to sex offenders convicted of certain
enumerated offenses and whose victims were under eighteen years
old when the crime was committed.128 The restriction on entering
school grounds applied twenty-four hours a day, while the restriction
on other facilities only applied when children were present.129 “A
violation of SARA was a violation of parole”; however, no separate
sanction was provided for a violation.130
In 2005, SARA was amended to expand the definition of
“school grounds” and incorporated the definition found in Penal Law
§ 220.00.131 SARA was also amended to cover sex offenders
classified as high risk, level 3 sex offenders under SORA and to
apply the geographical restraints regardless of the victims’ age.132
The statute does not expressly mention any residential restraints, but
the expanded definition of “school grounds” is found to operate as a
restriction on both residence and travel.133
B.

SARA and the Intent-Effects Test in New York
State

New York State courts mirror the analysis of federal courts
when it comes to determining whether a statute violates the
prohibition on ex post facto laws.134 SARA establishes restraints
similar to SORA restraints, and thus, the ex post facto clause analysis

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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of SORA in People v. Parilla135 is identical to the one applied in
Williams. In analyzing the statute’s effects and determining whether
they are punitive, the court used the seven Kennedy factors.136
However, the court in Parilla noted that the United States Supreme
Court has not indicated which factors are more significant than
others; thus, no one factor is determinative.137
In addition, in Berlin v. Evans,138 the Supreme Court of New
York in New York County applied the same ex post facto clause
analysis to the geographical restraints imposed by SARA on an
elderly gentleman with a prior sex conviction who was prohibited
from returning to his New York City apartment.139 In Berlin, the
court applied the framework outlined in Smith in determining
whether the statute at issue violated the ex post facto clause.140
VII.

DISCUSSION

Williams v. Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision raised the issue of whether the 1000-foot buffer zone
provided in New York’s SARA is a violation of the ex post facto
clause because it is unreasonable and excessive when applied to sex
offender parolees residing in urban neighborhoods such as New York
City.141 It is unlikely that SARA would be held unconstitutional for
excessiveness due to the deference to legislative intent of civil
regulatory schemes given by the courts.142
After assessing the various federal and state cases applying
the Kennedy factors, it is reasonable to conclude that the court in
Williams correctly held that SARA does not violate the constitutional
135

970 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) (holding that SORA and its registration
and notification requirements were not punitive in nature and did not violate the ex post facto
clause).
136
Id. at 497.
137
Id. at 501.
138
923 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that SARA was punitive in
nature and violated the ex post facto clause as applied to a parolee who was seventy-seven
years old, a first-time offender, and a low-risk, level 1 sex offender. The court reasoned that
the absence of individual assessment rendered the statute punitive).
139
Id. at 834-35.
140
Id. at 834 (showing the Berlin court’s indirect application of the Kennedy factors by
applying the Smith framework); see supra note 98 and accompanying text (illustrating the
Smith court’s application of the Kennedy factors).
141
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 18.
142
Id. at 20.
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prohibition on ex post facto laws.143 Courts have also held that
SORA, which is similar to SARA in many aspects, does not impose
punishment, and thus, is not a violation of the ex post facto clause.144
In addition, SORA’s public notification registry does not result in the
banishment of sexual offenders in their communities.145 The
exclusion sexual offenders experience as a result of SORA, such as
the eviction by a landlord or community pressure to move, are private
actions and, however unfortunate, were not intended by the New
York legislature when SORA was enacted.146
However, SARA is distinguishable from SORA in that SARA
expressly prohibits parolees from residing or traveling within 1000
feet of a place where children often congregate.147 Thus, this
involves state action that results in the removal of the parolee from
his community and consequently, banishment.148 Moreover, there is
apparently no case precedent to show that a 1000-foot buffer zone in
an urban neighborhood can be considered excessive to the extent that
it is punitive for making it unreasonably difficult for sex offender
parolees to find suitable housing and travel within the city.149 A
geographic restraint with a 1000-foot radius can result in banishment
in highly urbanized areas such as New York City, which is what
happened in the Williams case.150
When Williams raised the argument of banishment, the court
did not provide sufficient reasoning to support the finding that the
geographical restraints of SARA are not punishment.151 The court
simply reasoned that its resemblance to “banishment” is only a label
that does little to prove punitive effect.152 However, the geographical
restraints imposed result in an excessive and unreasonable limitation
143

Id.
Parilla, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 499. The defendant in this case argued that the SORA was
punitive in nature and violated the ex post facto clause because the statute imposed more
stringent registration and notice requirements for convicted sex offenders. Id.
145
Id. at 503.
146
Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1284.
147
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 23.
148
Parilla, 970 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (“[B]anishment involved state action in removing the
offender from a locality . . . .”).
149
See supra note 12 (Apart from the New York Supreme Court case, Berlin, there is no
case that discusses similar issues in Williams. Thus, there is no binding authority on the
New York Court of Appeals on defendant’s appeal).
150
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 26-27.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 27.
144
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on parolees who have already done their time. Thus, the courts
should highly consider focusing more on excessiveness as a factor in
determining whether SARA is punitive.
Accordingly, an
individualized assessment can prevent this unreasonable and
excessive burden on the parolee. Although the Williams court
already rejected such a proposal because parolees have limited
liberties, it is still necessary to consider the effects of the restraint as
applied to a parolee.153
The residential restrictions imposed by SARA only apply
when certain offenses are committed and if the victim was under 18
years old at the time of the crime.154 However, if the offender is
determined to be a level three sex offender, the residential restrictions
are applied regardless of the victim’s age due to the high risk of
recidivism.155 SARA adopts the three-tier SORA Risk Assessment
Instrument in considering the risk of recidivism of each sex
offender.156 In that regard, the individual assessment that courts
should apply must include an assessment that not only addresses the
recidivism of the sex offender but also his residency before
incarceration. It is not surprising that residency restrictions cause sex
offenders to be homeless due to the inability to find law-compliant
housing.157 There are studies that show that the residency restrictions
only force sex offenders to slip to the “fringes of society,” which may
later be problematic since “community reintegration, therapy, and
stability help reduce recidivism among the majority of offenders.”158
This takes into account both the dangers that sex offenders pose to
153

Id. at 31.
Id. at 21.
155
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 21.
156
See N.Y. St. Unified Ct. Sys., Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment
Guidelines and Commentary, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/06_SORAGuidelines.pdf
(discussing the factors in determining a sex offender’s level of risk) (last visited Feb. 16,
2017).
157
Joseph Goldstein, Housing Restrictions Keep Sex Offenders in Prison Beyond Release
Dates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/nyregion/with-newlimits-on-where-they-can-go-sex-offenders-are-held-after-serving-sentences.html?_r=0
(illustrating how a previously convicted sex offender is forced to live in a homeless shelter
and even potentially be asked to leave the homeless shelter due to limited facilities and its
proximity to schools or places where children congregate).
158
Amanda Moghaddam, Comment, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The
Punitive Effect of Sex Offender Residency Statutes from an Empirical Perspective, 40 SW. L.
REV. 223, 236 (2010); see also Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender
Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 1 International
J. of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 168-78 (2005).
154
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children in communities and the potential for rehabilitation of sex
offenders.159
This proposed solution would yield a different result in
Williams. If the assessment found that the 1000-foot barrier is unduly
restrictive and burdensome to the parolee, then a court would
determine whether to give more leeway to the parolee by putting
more weight on whether the statute is excessive.160 Given that
Williams was barred from finding suitable housing and from
traveling in New York City, the place where he lived before he was
incarcerated, the Williams court would have taken this excessive
burden into consideration and would have allowed Williams to access
places within SARA’s 1000-foot radius restriction.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Williams v. Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision concerned an issue of first impression of whether
SARA’s geographical restraints in an urban neighborhood were
punitive in intent and effect, and thus, a violation of the ex post facto
clause.161 In determining whether a statute violates the ex post facto
clause, courts use the factors established in Kennedy.162 Statutes
involving ex post facto claims are not exactly alike, and courts have
the discretion to decide which factors to emphasize because the
factors are only guidelines.163 As a result, the courts more often than
not give deference to the legislature and uphold the constitutionality
of the law.164
The Williams court rejected the argument that the statute is
akin to banishment without considering the repercussions on a
parolee living in an urban neighborhood such as Manhattan.165 The
New York Court of Appeals and courts hearing similar cases should
take the density of an urban neighborhood into consideration in
assessing whether the restraints are so excessive that they impose
additional punishment for the parolee. SARA was enacted with the
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

See LEVENSON, supra note 158, at 173.
See discussion, supra Section VI.B.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 31.
372 U.S. at 168.
See discussion, supra Section VI.B.
See discussion, supra Section VII.
Williams, 24 N.Y.S.3d at 27.
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aim of protecting children from sex offenders.166 However, as Judge
Damon Keith, in his dissenting opinion, articulated in Doe v.
Bredesen,167 “We must be careful, in our rush to condemn one of the
most despicable crimes in our society, not to undermine the freedom
and constitutional rights that make our nation great.”168

166

See discussion infra Section VI.A.
521 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2008) (The issue in this case was whether the ex post facto
clause was violated by the Registration Act and Surveillance Act for sexual offenders).
168
521 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2008) (Keith, J., dissenting).
167
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